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Abstract
This note is a critical examination of the argument of Frauchiger
and Renner [4], in which they claim to show that three reasonable
assumptions about the use of quantum mechanics jointly lead to a
contradiction. It is shown that further assumptions are needed to es-
tablish the contradiction, and that each of these assumptions is invalid
in some version of quantum mechanics.
1 Introduction
In the title of [4] Frauchiger and Renner (hereafter FR) proclaim that “Quan-
tum mechanics cannot consistently describe the use of itself”. To justify this,
they claim to prove that a certain set of three assumptions, labelled (Q), (C)
and (S), cannot be jointly satisfied in quantum mechanics. I refer to [4] for
their own precise statements of these assumptions; they can be expressed as
follows.
Assumption (Q) If an agent A is certain that a system is in an
eigenstate of an observable X with eigenvalue ξ at time t0, and a
measurement of X is completed at time t > t0, then A is certain
that the result x of the measurement is x = ξ at time t.
Assumption (C) If agent A is certain that another agent A′ is
certain that x = ξ at time t, on the same grounds as in (Q), then
A is also certain that x = ξ at time t.
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Assumption (S) If A is certain that the proposition x = ξ is
true, then A is certain that the proposition x 6= ξ is not true.
Assumption (C) is the property of consistency which Frauchiger and Ren-
ner seek to deny to quantum mechanics. These assumptions will be discussed
in section 4.
The argument proceeds by applying these assumptions in analysing a
Gedankenexperiment obtained by extending the “Wigner’s friend” experi-
ment described by Wigner in [16]. This Gedankenexperiment is described in
Section 2. The argument of FR is laid out in steps in Section 3; at each step
we consider whether it follows from the assumptions declared by FR, and,
if not, what further assumptions are needed to establish it. In Section 4 we
examine each of the assumptions and discuss whether they are held to be
true in various versions (or interpretations) of quantum mechanics.
2 The Gedankenexperiment
The experiment which is supposed to demonstrate that the assumptions (Q),
(C) and (S) lead to a contradiction contains four systems F1, F2,W1 and W2.
These systems represent agents. Each agent X has three orthogonal states
|0〉X , |a〉X and |b〉X where |0〉X is a state of readiness before X participates
in the experiment and |a〉 and |b〉 are states in which X is certain that the
result of a certain observable sX is given by the label a or b. In addition, there
are two qubit systems: a coin C and the spin state S of an electron, with
orthogonal states |head〉C and |tail〉C for C, |±〉S for S. I will refer to F1 and
F2, who operate on the physical systems C and S, as “experimenters”, and
W1 and W2 as “para-experimenters” since they operate on the experimenters
F1 and F2.
The experiment, the extended Wigner’s friend experiment or EWF, pro-
ceeds in several stages.
Stage EWF(−1) Before the experiment starts the coin is prepared in
the state
√
1
3
|head〉+
√
2
3
|tail〉.
Stage EWF0 At time t = 0 experimenter F1 observes the coin and
records the result r = “head” or “tail”, thereby being put into a memory
state |r〉F1.
Stage EWF1 At time t = 1, F1 prepares the electron as follows: if the
result of the measurement at t = 0 was r = “head”, F1 prepares the electron
in spin state | ↓〉S; if r = “tail”, they prepare it in spin state
2
| →〉S = 1√
2
(| ↑〉S + | ↓〉S.
Stage EWF2 At time t = 2 experimenter F2 measures the spin z
1
2
~ of
the electron (z = ±) in the basis {| ↑〉, | ↓〉} and records the result, thereby
being put into a memory state |z〉F2.
Stage EWF3 At time t = 3 para-experimenter W1 measures F1, to-
gether with the coin, in the basis
|ok〉F1C = 1√2
(|head〉F1 |head〉C − |tail〉F1|tail〉C
)
|fail〉F1C = 1√2
(|head〉F1 |head〉C + |tail〉F1 |tail〉C
)
,
and records the result w1 = “ok” or “fail”.
Stage EWF4 At time t = 4 para-experimenter W2 measures F2, to-
gether with the electron, in the basis
|ok〉F2S = 1√2
(|−〉F2| ↓〉S − |+〉F2| ↑〉S
)
|fail〉F2S = 1√2
(|−〉F2| ↓〉S + |+〉F1| ↑〉S
)
,
and records the result w2 = “ok” or “fail”.
Stage EWF5 At the end of the experiment the two para-experimenters
compare the results of their measurements. The question is whether it is
possible for w1 = w2 = “ok”.
3 The Argument
Frauchiger and Renner argue as follows.
Step FR1. Suppose that F1 got the value r = “tails” in the measurement
on the system C. Then F1 will prepare the system S in the state | →〉. After
this, therefore, let us say at time t = 1.5, F1 is certain that S is in the state
| →〉.
This deduction requires the undeclared assumption
Assumption (P) If an agent A prepares a system S in a state
|ψ〉, then immediately after the preparation A is certain that S
is in the state |ψ〉.
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What could be more innocent? Surely this needs stating even less than
the logical assumption (S). I do not believe so, but will defer discussion until
the next section.
Step FR2. F1 proceeds from the certainty that S is in the state | →〉
at time t = 1.5 to the certainty that after time t = 2, when the electron S
has been sent to F2 and measured by F2, the state of F2 and S (the lab L in
[4]) will be
√
1
2
(|−〉F2S + |+〉F2S
)
and therefore orthogonal to |ok〉F2S.
This step requires a stronger assumption than (Q): the certainty of F!
about future events comes from reliance on the predictions of quantum me-
chanics applied to the whole world external to F1. In particular, F1 must
treat agent F2 as part of a quantum system, whose states, therefore, may not
have definite values. This is
Assumption (U) If an agent A is certain at time t that the
external world is in a state |Ψ〉 and A knows the Hamiltonian H
governing the external world, then A is certain at time t that the
state of the external world at time t+ T will be e−iHT/~|Ψ〉.
The need for this assumption has also been noted by Nurgalieva and del
Rio [9].
Step FR3 It follows from this, by Assumption (Q), that the measure-
ment of F2S by W2 at time t = 3 will give the result w = “fail”. Thus
If F1 at time t = 0 gets the result r = “tails”, then F1 is certain
at time t = 1.5 that W2 will observe w = “fail” at time t = 3.
Step FR4 Now suppose that the result of the measurement of S by F2
at time t = 2 is z = +. Then F2 is certain after this measurement, let us
say at time t = 2.5, that the state of S when it was passed on by F1 was
not | ↓〉, and therefore that F1 did not get the result r = “head” from the
measurement of the coin C.
Step FR5 It follows (to F2), by Assumption (S), that F1 got the result
r = “tail”.
This does not follow from Assumption (S). What FR are assuming ap-
pears to be the converse,
Assumption (S) If A is certain that the proposition x 6= ξ is
not true, then A is certain that x = ξ is true,
but for use in this step of the argument, this assumption needs to be stated
more precisely as
4
Assumption (T) If the possible values of a measurement result
are r1, r2, . . . and an agent A is certain that the result was not r1,
then A is certain that the result was one of r2, . . ..
Step FR6 Therefore, by the conclusion of Step FR3, F2 is certain at
time t = 2.5 that F1 was certain at time t = 1.5 that W2 will observe w =
“fail” at time t = 3.
Step FR7 By Assumption (C), F2 is certain at time t = 2.5 that W2
will observe w = “fail” at time t = 3.
This step requires consideration of the times at which the agents hold
their various certainties. In the statement by FR, Assumption (C) contains
no mention of these times. If it is assumed that it refers to certainties held at
the same time, then the deduction FR5 assumes that the memory state of F1
is unchanged between the times t = 1.5 and t = 2.5. This is reasonable, since
there has apparently been no dynamical action on F1 in this time interval,
but it needs to be deduced from some general assumption. One possible form
for this assumption is
Assumption (L) If there is no action in the neighbourhood of
a system F in a certain time interval, then the state of F remains
unchanged during that interval.
An alternative assumption which would justify Step FR7 is
Assumption (M) Memory states of an agent are irreversible
and do not change once they have been established unless there
is some surgical operation on, or neural pathology in, the agent.
Note that we consider memory states to be the same as states of certainty.
Step FR8 FR now consider the measurement of F1C by W1 in Stage
EWF3, in conjunction with the measurement of S by F2 in Stage EWF2.
They argue that the eigenvectors of this joint measurement are
|ok, z〉F1CS = |ok〉F1C |z〉S and |fail, z〉F1CS = |fail〉F1C |z〉S.
More precisely, taking account of the fact that when W1 measures F1C,
the experimenter F2 has measured S and therefore F2 and S have become
entangled, so that the measurement by W1 is enacted on the space HF1CS ⊗
HF2 , we should consider the eigenspaces of this measurement which are
Hok,z = |ok〉F1C |z〉S ⊗HF2 and Hfail,z = |fail, z〉F1C |z〉S ⊗HF2 .
5
The measurement is performed on the state
1√
6
(
2|fail〉F1C | ↓〉S|−〉F2 + |fail〉F1C | ↑〉S|+〉F2 − |ok〉F1C | ↑〉S|+〉F2
)
which is orthogonal to Hok,−. It is therefore not possible that W1 gets the
result w1 = “ok” while F2 gets the result z = −.
Step FR9 Hence if W1 gets the result w1 = “ok”, then W1 at time
t = 3.5 is certain that F2 must have got the result z = + and therefore, by
Step FR7, F2 was certain at time t = 2.5 that W2 will get the result w2 =
“fail” at time t = 5.
Step FR10 It follows by Assumptions (C) and (L) that W1 is certain
at time t = 3.5 that W2 will get the result w2 = “fail” at time t = 5.
Step FR11 WhenW1 announces this certainty toW2, the latter will also
become certain, by Assumption (C), that the result of the final measurement
must be w2 = “fail”. Thus
If W1 gets the result w1 = “ok”, W2 is certain at time t = 3.5
that he will get the result w2 = “fail”.
Step FR12 But W2 can calculate the probability that the results of the
final two measurements will be w1 = w2 = “ok”; a straightforward quantum-
mechanical calculation (e.g. [13]) shows that this probability is 1/12. W2 is
therefore certain that the result of the measurements of W1 and W2 can be
w1 = w2 =“ok”, in contradiction to the conclusion of Step FR11.
4 Discussion of the Assumptions
4.1
Assumption (Q) If an agent A is certain that a system is in an
eigenstate of an observable X with eigenvalue ξ at time t0, and a
measurement of X is completed at time t > t0, then A is certain
that the result x of the measurement is x = ξ at time t.
The wording “A is certain that x = ξ at time t” is taken directly from
[4]. It is ambiguous, but must be understood to mean “A is certain at time
t that x = ξ”. The alternative reading is that the content of A’s certainty is
“x = ξ at time t”. But this does not make sense, since x is a single value,
the result of the experiment, and does not depend on t.
With this understanding, Assumption (Q) appears to be a standard as-
sertion of quantum mechanics. FR discuss whether it holds in all versions of
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quantum mechanics, and conclude that it does not hold in hidden-variable
theories such as Bohmian mechanics, appealing to an unspecified calculation
in Bohmian mechanics in which, they assert, the conclusion of Step FR3
does not hold. It is not clear what supports this assertion, since Bohmian
mechanics requires particle positions which are not present in their scenario.
The Gedankenexperiment can be analysed in Bell’s probabilistic extension
of Bohmian mechanics [13]. Here the hidden variables are the memories (or
certainties) of the four agents, which have definite values at all times. The
result of the Bell-Bohmian analysis is that a possible sequence of memories
of the agents is as follows:
At Stage EWF(−1): |0〉F1|0〉F2|0〉W1|0〉W2
After Stage EWF0: |tail〉F1|0〉F2|0〉W1|0〉W2
After Stage EWF2: |tail〉F1|+〉F2|0〉W1|0〉W2
After Stage EWF3: |tail〉F1|+〉F2|ok〉W1|0〉W2
After Stage EWF4: |tail〉F1|−〉F2|ok〉W1|ok〉W2.
This model does not contain variables describing the beliefs of any of
the agents about the other agents or other aspects of the external world.
However, we can assume that in each of the states labelled as above, each
agent has consulted the other agents and therefore is certain that the beliefs
of the other agents are given by the labels in the state. Then at time t = 1.5
agent F1 is certain that the state of S is | →〉, in agreement with Assumption
(Q), but at time t = 2.5 they are certain that the state of F2 is |+〉F2,
so that Step FR2 is invalid. Thus it is not Assumption (Q) but (U) that
may be violated in Bohmian mechanics. This is probably also true in the
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which can be taken to
assert that macroscopic variables such as the beliefs of agents always have
definite values.
4.2
Assumption (C) If agent A is certain that another agent A′ is
certain that x = ξ at time t, on the same grounds as in (Q), then
A is also certain that x = ξ at time t.
I find it hard to see how this assumption is violated in any interpretation
of quantum mechanics, except possibly QBism. FR assert that it is violated
in five different interpretations, but they discuss only three of these. In two of
these cases their argument is that Assumptions (Q) and (S) are satisfied and
therefore Assumption (C) must be violated, otherwise their theorem would
show that the interpretation contains a contradiction. As shown above, this
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inference is invalid; all that is shown is that one of the assumptions (C), (P),
(U) or (T), or both of (L) and (M), are violated.
In the third case, that of the Consistent Histories (CH) interpretation [6],
FR offer to illustrate how the violation of (C) manifests itself. They consider
the statements
h1: The outcomes r = “tails”, z = +, w1 = “ok” and w2 = “ok”
were observed”
and
h′
1
: The outcomes r = “tails” and w2 = “ok” were observed
and calculate the probabilities
P [h1] =
1
12
and P [h′
1
] = 0
by considering h1 and h
′
1 as histories in the sense of the CH interpretation,
namely as sequences of projectors. These probabilities appear to be in conflict
with the fact that h1 implies h
′
1
, but FR note that the CH interpretation does
not allow these two histories to be considered together, and interpret this as a
violation of Assumption (C). However, the meaning of the history (sequence
of projectors) into which FR translate h′1 is not h
′
1 but
h′′
1
: The outcomes r = tails and w2 = ok were observed, and z
and w2 were not observed,
which clearly is not implied by h1. The tension between h1 and h
′′
1 looks
more like a violation of Assumption (S), which we discuss next.
4.3
Assumption (S) If agent A is certain that the proposition x = ξ
is true, then A is certain that the proposition x 6= ξ is not true.
As stated here, this is satisfied in all versions of quantum mechanics.
What may not be satisfied is the converse,
Assumption (S) If A is certain that the proposition x 6= ξ is
not true, then A is certain that x = ξ is true.
It is Assumption (S) which FR use in Step FR5. However, there is still
some ambiguity in the above Assumption (S). Here (as in FR’s statement
of Assumption S), the nature of x is unspecified. If x is a number or other
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classical variable, then Assumption (S) is equivalent to (S). But if x is a
quantum observable, then the proposition x = ξ means that the state of the
system lies in the eigenspace of x with eigenvalue ξ, while x 6= ξ means that
it lies in the orthogonal subspace. Clearly, then, x = ξ implies the denial of
x 6= ξ, but the converse implication does not hold.
In FR’s argument the status of x shifts in the course of the argument.
Originally, x is defined to be the result of a measurement (by F1), and in
standard quantum mechanics this is a classical variable. In the later stages
of the Gedankenexperiment, however, x, the content of F1’s memory, is a
quantum variable and therefore Assumption (S) is invalid. In Step FR5 F2
argues as if Assumption (T) refers to a classical variable; but knowing that
W1 is going to operate on F1 as a quantum system, F1’s deduction in Step
5 should proceed via Assumption (S) with x understood to be a quantum
variable.
In their table 4 [4] FR assert that Assumption (S) is not satisfied in the
“many worlds” interpretation of quantum mechanics. Presumably this refers
to the popular account of this interpretation according to which something
can be true in this world but false in another world, so an agent A can be
certain that x = ξ while not denying that x 6= ξ. But this is equivocation:
x in the first statement does not refer to the same thing as x in the second
statement. In A’s statement that x = ξ, the symbol x means “the result
of the measurement in my world”, while in x 6= ξ it means “the result of
the measurement in another world”. In the many-worlds interpretation as
much as in any other interpretation, A cannot be certain that x = ξ without
denying that x 6= ξ unless they change the meaning of x.
This completes the discussion of the assumptions stated by FR. We have
found only one version of quantum mechanics that might not satisfy one of
these assumptions, namely the case of QBism and Assumption (C). This is
summarised in Table 1 (compare Table 4 of [4], which differs in many lines).
(Q) (S) (C)
Copenhagen
√ √ √
Collapse theories e.g. [5]
√ √ √
Bell-Bohm [11] pp. 215-217
√ √ √
Relative-state [7, 14, 11, 10, 12]
√ √ √
Many worlds [3]
√ √ √
Consistent histories [6]
√ √ √
QBism [2]
√ √ ×
Table 1: The assumptions of FR
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We see that in all cases except for QBism, we must look elsewhere, in
the other assumptions not declared by FR, if we are to acquit versions of
quantum mechanics of the charge of contradiction.
4.4
Assumption (P) If an agent A prepares a system S in a state
|ψ〉, then immediately after the preparation A is certain that S
is in the state |ψ〉.
This appears to be obvious, and guaranteed by the very meaning of prepa-
ration of a state. However, if F1 is an adherent of the “many worlds” or “rel-
ative state” interpretations of quantum mechanics, then they know that they
have become entangled with the coin by their measurement in Stage EWF0,
and therefore the coin is in a mixed state. What, then, do they determine
when they observe the coin and prepare it? In “many worlds” terms, they
know that there is a world in which they got the result “heads” on observing
the coin and prepared it in the state | ↓〉, but they find out that they are in
the other world in which they got the result “tails” on observing the coin and
prepared it in the state | →〉. In “relative state” terms, they know that the
absolute state is the entangled state, but that the state relative to themself is
what they observe and prepare. Thus this assumption amounts to ignoring
the difference between the absolute state and the relative state.
4.5
Assumption (U) If an agent A is certain at time t that the
external world is in a state |Ψ〉 and A knows the Hamiltonian H
governing the external world, then A is certain at time t that the
state of the external world at time t+ T will be e−iHT/~|Ψ〉.
This looks like an essential part of quantum mechanics in any interpreta-
tion. However, it is violated in the Copenhagen interpretation (and therefore
in most textbook presentations of quantum mechanics), since that requires
that unitary evolution is interrupted by the projection that occurs whenever
a measurement is made.
This assumption might also be violated in the Bell-Bohm hidden-variables
theory, depending on what the word “state” is taken to mean: in that theory
there is a pilot state, which satisfies assumption (U), and the actual state,
which does not. Likewise in the relative-state interpretation, the meaning of
the assumption depends on whether the word “state” refers to the external
or the internal state. However, the use of this assumption requires “state”
to refer to the pilot state in the Bell-Bohm theory, and the external state in
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the relative-state interpretation, so in both these cases we can take it that
Assumption (U) is satisfied. These meanings of “state”, however, render
Assumption (P) invalid.
4.6
Assumption (T) If the possible values of a measurement result
are r1, r2, . . . and an agent A is certain that the result was not r1,
then A is certain that the result was one of r2, . . ..
This assumption is satisfied if agent A is adopting the Copenhagen in-
terpretation, where a measurement result is taken to be a classical variable.
This requires that all the other agents are also adopting this interpretation,
if Assumption (C) is to be applicable. In Bell-Bohm theory it is also satisfied
if the actual state is taken to be defined by the memories of all the agents, as
in [13]; but other versions of this theory are possible, in which Assumption
(T) may not be satisfied.
In the relative-state interpretation assumption (T) is satisfied if it refers
to a measurement performed by the agent A, who will then treat the result
as a classical variable, but not if it was performed by any of the other agents,
who, for A, are quantum sytems and the result of the measurement is a
quantum variable.
4.7
Assumption (L) If there is no action in the neighbourhood of
a system F in a certain time interval, then the state of F remains
unchanged during that interval.
This is an assumption of locality, which is well known, following the work
of John Bell [1], to be violated in hidden-variable interpretations of quan-
tum mechanics. In particular, it is violated by the Bell-Bohm interpretation
discussed above. However, the application of this interpretation shown in
subsection 4.2 actually satisfies Assumption (L).
Long before Bell’s work, it was pointed out by Einstein ([8] p.373) that
the projection postulate of the Copenhagen interpretation also displays a
violation of locality.
4.8
Assumption (M) Memory states of an agent are irreversible
and do not change once they have been established unless there
is some surgical operation on, or neural pathology in, the agent.
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This is satisfied by the Copenhagen interpretation, in which the mem-
ory of an agent can be taken as the result of a measurement, though it is
doubtful whether the qubit systems which model agents in the FR Gedanken-
experiment could be accepted as measurement apparatuses in the spirit of
the Copenhagen interpretation. Stages EWF3 and EWF4 of the Gedanken-
experiment, in which the agents and their labs are measured in a basis of
superpositions of memory states, must be regarded as surgical operations.
Spontaneous collapse theories would also satisfy this assumption if the
agents’ memories were macroscopic systems, but not for FR’s model of mem-
ories as qubit systems. The assumption is not necessarily satisfied by the
Bell-Bohm interpretation, though, as for locality, the particular history de-
rived in subsection 4.2 does satisfy it (the change between EWF3 and EWF4
being taken as the result of surgery).
4.9 Summary
The status of all the assumptions in various interpretations and versions of
quantum mechanics is shown in the table below. An interpretation must
violate one of (Q), (C), (S), (P), (U), (T), or both of (L) and (M), in order
to escape FR’s charge of inconsistency.
(Q) (S) (C) (P) (U) (T) (L) (M)
Copenhagen
√ √ √ √ × √ × √
Collapse theories e.g. [5]
√ √ √ √ × √ × ×
Bell-Bohm [11] pp. 215-217
√ √ √ √ × √ × ×
Relative-state [7, 14, 11, 10, 12]
√ √ √ × √ × × ×
Many worlds [3]
√ √ √ × √ × × ×
Consistent histories [6]
√ √ √ √ √ √ × √
QBism [2]
√ √ × √ √ √ √ √
Table 2: All assumptions
I have not argued in detail for all of these attributions; they may be dis-
puted. If valid, however, they show that the consistency property expressed
in Assumption (C) does not have to be dropped by any interpretation of
quantum mechanics except, possibly, QBism.
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5 Conclusion
We have examined the argument of Frauchiger and Renner, in which a con-
tradiction is deduced from three assumptions whose joint content can be
expressed as “Quantum mechanics can describe the use of itself”. We have
found that a number of other assumptions are made in deducing the contra-
diction, and that several interpretations of quantum mechanics fail to satisfy
one or more of these other assumptions, and can therefore consistently be
held without accepting the contention of Frauchiger and Renner that quan-
tum mechanics cannot describe the use of itself.
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